Executive summary
The deteriorating security environment in the Strait of Hormuz has driven vessel traffic back to crisis-era lows. Preliminary data show 39 transits during 20–26 July, down from 82 the previous week. Non-Iranian-linked traffic declined 27% week on week, although vessels continue to move in and out of the Gulf.
A near-term recovery in traffic is unlikely. Neither Tehran nor Washington has shifted position materially, leaving owners reluctant to resume normal trading patterns. Non-Iranian traffic is expected to remain limited, while shadow fleet vessels increasingly fill gaps left by mainstream tanker and gas carrier operators.
Key takeaways
Non-Iranian-linked traffic — defined by ownership, trade exposure or sanctions status — remains subdued. Preliminary figures show 22 transits during 20–26 July, down from 30 the previous week.
Fifteen non-Iranian vessels exited the Gulf during the week, primarily tankers and bulk carriers, including seven laden VLCCs.
Owner confidence remains weak. Only seven non-Iranian vessels entered the Gulf last week: three product tankers, three crude tankers and one bulk carrier.
Inbound Gulf traffic is down more than 90% compared with levels before the strikes on Iran.
War risk premiums have risen sharply as underwriters reassess Gulf exposure following renewed US-Iran hostilities. Recent quotes have returned to 7.5%–10% of hull value.
Dark activity remains exceptionally high. Seventy per cent of traffic last week was untraceable via AIS. Of the 22 non-Iranian-linked transits, 21 operated dark, with only one China-linked bulker visible through Iran’s traffic system.
Ships continue to bypass Iran’s prescribed corridor to sail into and out of the Gulf, opting for the southern route that tracks Oman’s coastline.
Trackable Iranian traffic has fallen sharply, from 49 transits during 13–19 July to 15 last week. The reinstated US naval blockade is restricting access to the Gulf of Oman, while widespread AIS shutdowns continue to obscure activity.

Source: Lloyd’s List Intelligence Strait of Hormuz Transit Monitor
Security summary
No new attacks on mainstream shipping were recorded during the past week, but the threat level remains severe. Combined Maritime Forces continues to assess deliberate hostile action as highly likely.
US Central Command is maintaining its blockade of Iranian ports, reporting that 18 merchant ships have been redirected and two vessels disabled.
Iran resumed direct attacks on US forces on Wednesday, launching a ballistic missile strike after several days of relative calm. The move came despite reports of positive US-Iran talks and renewed threats from President Trump to target Iranian civilian infrastructure if negotiations fail.
Oman is reportedly advancing a proposal for joint management of the Strait of Hormuz, modelled on the Strait of Malacca framework and funded through voluntary service charges. Industry and diplomatic sources say discussions are progressing and that US negotiators may be receptive. Iran, however, continues to reject proposals that do not leave it in full control of the waterway.
Risk outlook
Elevated geopolitical tensions are likely to keep traffic depressed, although owners and operators are expected to respond quickly to any credible diplomatic breakthrough.
High war risk premiums are making Gulf voyages commercially challenging, with only the most profitable trades supporting insurance costs at current rates.
Chinese and Indian owners are reportedly securing more favourable insurance terms through regional markets, allowing some operators to maintain exposure.
Shadow fleet vessels continue attempting to breach the US blockade to load Iranian crude. Several have conducted U-turns and repositioned nearby, or loitered near the blockade line, suggesting operators are adopting a wait-and-see approach rather than exiting the trade entirely.
Non-sanctioned shadow fleet tankers and gas carriers are increasingly replacing mainstream operators in lifting compliant Gulf cargoes. With employment options reduced by developments in Iran and Venezuela, these risk-tolerant vessels are well positioned to capture lucrative Gulf business. Nearly 30 tankers and LPG carriers have "flipped" into shadow fleet service since the conflict began.
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* Lloyd’s List Intelligence defines a tanker as being part of the Shadow Fleet if it engages in one or more deceptive shipping practices indicating that it is involved in the facilitation of sanctioned oil cargoes from Iran, Russia or Venezuela. Or it is sanctioned for participation in sanctioned oil trades or is sanctioned for links to a company that is sanctioned for facilitating the export of sanctioned oil. Or it participates in a cargo delivery where at some point over the course of the delivery one party in the chain engages in one or more deceptive shipping practices.
Lloyd’s List defines an LPG carrier as being part of the LPG Shadow Fleet if it engages in one or more deceptive shipping practices, or if it is sanctioned by the US, UK or EU.
Seasearcher subscribers can activate the Shadow Fleet list by clicking the links above.
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