Vessels that fit the Houthi’s so-called “target profile” are doing more than just rerouting to avoid being targeted by the Iranian-backed militant group.
Vessels that fit the Houthi’s so-called “target profile” are doing more than just rerouting to avoid being targeted by the Iranian-backed militant group.
In the first half of 2024 there were 275 instances of vessels disabling their Automatic Identification System (AIS) data while sailing significant distances across the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea on voyages unrelated to Red Sea transits, according to Lloyd’s List Intelligence data.
This figure was 62 over the same period in 2023.
While it is not unheard of for vessels to travel long distances under the cover of AIS gaps in this area, the profile of ships disabling their AIS is different, as are the locations of where the gap is taking place.
Vessels affiliated with Israel, the UK and US, as well as ships within fleets that have been targeted by the Houthis in the past, accounted for 73% of the gaps recorded in the first half of 2024.
That is up from 30% in 2023.
The start and end coordinates of the gap are in areas or adjacent to areas that the Houthis have threatened to attack ships.
The country affiliations of the vessels disabling AIS combined with the locations of the gaps suggest the ‘dark’ transits are a precautionary measure and a direct response to the Houthis’ campaign of aggression against merchant shipping.
The US Maritime Administration and Joint Maritime Information Centre have said that transmitting AIS in the Houthi threat area, or in the vicinity of it, puts vessels at greater risk, as it aids the Houthis in targeting ships.
Despite recommendations to operate offline while sailing through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, the majority of vessels that continue to transit the Bab el Mandeb do so with AIS enabled.
Only 6% to 9% of weekly passings through the Bab el Mandeb are ‘dark’ transits, according to analysis of Lloyd’s List Intelligence data. In absolute terms the volume of gaps is similar to levels seen last year.
But it is not just ships sailing in the immediate region of the Houthi threat area that are deciding to operate offline, with a significant jump in vessels sailing across the Indian Ocean between the Cape of Good Hope and coasts of India as well as Indonesia.
In the first half of 2023 there was a negligible number of AIS gaps that fit this pattern, six in total.
The figure starts increasing in January of this year, with 12 gaps in that month alone, coinciding with the mass exodus from the Red Sea, which started in mid-December as the Houthi attacks became increasingly frequent and indiscriminate.
The number of AIS gaps have remained at elevated levels hitting a high of 20 in April, with 80 recorded from January to June of this year.
The Houthis announced in mid-March that they would expand the scope of their missile attacks to include ships in the Indian Ocean diverting around the Cape of Good Hope.
The first successful attack against a vessel in the Indian Ocean was on April 26, when a drone hit containership MSC Orion (IMO: 9857157).
Since then, there have been two instances of the Houthis attempting to attack ships further outside the traditional zone of aggression, according to JMIC data.
MSC Sarah V (IMO: 9181675) and Maersk Sentosa (IMO: 9315202) were targeted by missiles on June 24 and July 9, respectively.
Vessels are most often targeted by the Houthis within the established threat area, which encompasses the southern area of the Red Sea and western area of the Gulf of Aden.
Security analysts say that new weapons capabilities could spell more attempted attacks outside the traditional threat zone.
Subscribers can read the full article on Lloyd’s List here.
For the latest insight, data and analysis on the impact of Houthi attacks on commercial shipping, visit our Red Sea Risk hub.
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