Published: 8th January 2025
Taiwan suspects that China was behind the cutting of an international undersea telecom cable, but finding the vessel responsible is proving complicated because officials are chasing one vessel using three separate digital identities: Tanzania-flagged Xing Shun 39, Cameroon-flagged Shun Xing 39 and Cameroon-flagged Xing Shun 39
The vessel Taiwanese authorities believe is responsible for damaging an undersea cable off its coastline has three distinct digital identities, Lloyd’s List Intelligence data shows.
Analysis of the vessel’s recent operations suggests deliberate deceptive practices will frustrate Taiwan’s investigation into the incident that damaged part of the Trans Pacific Express system which connects Taiwan with the US West Coast on January 3.
According to the Taiwan Coast Guard Administration the culprit for the damage was a Cameroon-flagged vessel identified as “Shunxin39”.
On Monday, January 6, Lloyd’s List reported that “Shunxin39” was actually Tanzania-flagged Xing Shun 39 (IMO: 8358427).
But the true identity of the vessel is much more complicated. Both “Shunxin39” and Xing Shun 39 were involved in the incident, not as two vessels, but one ship with two identities.
A Taiwanese coastguard vessel approached “Shunxin39”, but CGA officers were unable to board thanks to bad weather.
However, Taiwan’s CGA told Lloyd’s List that the vessel they had approached had two Automatic Identification Systems with two MMSI (Maritime Mobile Service Identity) numbers. A MMSI is a unique nine-digit number assigned to a vessel for identifying and communicating via radio and AIS systems. One MMSI matched the Tanzania-flagged Xing Shun 39, and another belongs to a vessel in the Lloyd’s List Intelligence database as Cameroon-flagged Shun Xing 39
This second vessel only transmitted an International Maritime Organization in a couple of AIS transmissions. The IMO and MMSI associated with the vessel does not appear in the IMO’s Global Integrated Shipping Information System or the Equasis database.
Lloyd’s List Intelligence data shows the Tanzania-flagged Xing Shun 39 and Cameroon-flagged Shun Xing 39 were distinct vessels before October 1, 2024, with the AIS of both vessels broadcasting at the same time in completely different places.
Source: Seasearcher
This shows that the two vessels were distinct at one point, before the AIS were moved to one vessel in the future
The last instance of AIS overlap was between September 28-30, 2024, when Tanzania-flagged Xing Shun 39 broadcasts its AIS off the coast of South Korea, while Cameroon-flagged Shun Xing 39 is off the Taiwanese coast.
Yet at some point between October 1-19, 2024, both AIS units appear to be placed on the same vessel. Lloyd’s List Intelligence vessel-tracking data shows this quite clearly: from that time onward, the AIS of both vessels never overlap while operating in the same area. Instead, one goes “dark” for a period of time, while the other broadcasts, and vice versa.
This is perhaps most clearly demonstrated on January 3, where one AIS stops broadcasting, only for the other to begin almost immediately afterwards.
The vessel Taiwan’s CGA approached had two MMSI numbers, meaning in many cases it would appear as two distinct vessels to vessel-tracking databases and when viewed on navigational devices. This one ship has been sailing under two different identities since October 19, 2024.
Lloyd’s List Intelligence senior maritime data analyst Valerio Kim explained that “the use of multiple AIS systems can facilitate deceptive shipping practices”.
“To an observer, this strategy may create the illusion of multiple vessels being involved, thereby complicating the identification of the originating vessel,” he said.
However, there is a third identity being used by same vessel too. A search for “Xing Shun 39” reveals two vessels: the Tanzania-flagged Xing Shun 39 (IMO: 8358427) and Cameroon-flagged Xing Shun 39 (IMO: 8986951).
This third vessel has a separate MMSI number to the two supplied by CGA, and, crucially, an IMO number.
That IMO number displays as Vietnam-flagged, 2002-built, Bao Chau 16 on both GISIS and the Equasis database.
Bao Chau 16 began transmitting its name via AIS as Xing Shun 39 on March 30, 2024. These transmissions are linked to the IMO of Bao Chau 16 and an MMSI that is not recognised by GISIS.
The IMO number of Bau Chau 16 is being fraudulently used by the same vessel, and one of the “identities”, accused of damaging the undersea cable.
“In this case, evidence suggests that the vessel accused by Taiwan’s CGA assumed the identity of Bao Chau 16 by broadcasting its IMO number. It would be easier to assume the IMO without drawing attention of a vessel like Bao Chau 16 because no MMSI was reported for the vessel,” said Kim.
Lloyd’s List Intelligence data shows Cameroon-flagged Xing Shun 39 (formerly Bao Chau 16) broadcasting its AIS off Taiwan’s northwest coast on September 28, 2024. It then goes “dark” at 1026 hrs, but Cameroon-flagged Shun Xing 39 begins broadcasting on the same trajectory at 1045 hrs and continues broadcasting until October 6, 2024. This is the first time Cameroon-flagged Shun Xing 39 appears.
Once Shun Xing 39 stops broadcasting on October 6 at 1521 hrs, Xing Shun 39 (Bao Chau 16) begins broadcasting again on October 7, 2024, at 0112 hrs.
Source: Seasearcher
Source: Seasearcher
Therefore, Lloyd’s List understands that it is actually one vessel using three digital identities. These are: Tanzania-flagged Xing Shun 39, Cameroon-flagged Shun Xing 39 and Cameroon-flagged Xing Shun 39.
This act of masquerade causes significant confusion for anyone attempting to track the movements of the vessel Taiwan believes is responsible for the cable cutting on January 3, and will again in the future should any of the three digital identities begin broadcasting AIS data again (the last signal was received from Tanzania-flagged Xing Shun 39 on January 4, a day after the incident).
Ian Ralby, chief executive of consultants IR Consilium, called vessel identity theft and AIS manipulation the “jaywalking of maritime offences, in that people just tend not to care, or they don’t think it is something worthy of serious attention”.
“The problem is that these are often the easiest to identify indicators of other illicit or untoward activity, and so what we're looking at is a lot of vessels that are engaged in suspicious or dubious or outright dangerous behaviour and are being overlooked because we are essentially turning a blind eye towards a lot of these minor, seemingly innocuous offenses,” he said.
“Yet they could have been the tell to give us a leg up on actually addressing issues before they arise. So, states need to get more proactive in ensuring that they have legal wherewithal to do something about these minor offenses so that they don't incur more damage on account of major action taken by vessels engaged in this kind of conduct.”
The registered owner of Tanzania-flagged Xing Shun 39, Hong Kong-based Jie Yang Trading, has denied any involvement of its vessel.
Director Guo Wenjie told Reuters there was “no evidence at all” of the vessel being responsible for the damage to the cable.
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